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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason Zane Garner appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation
and executing his aggregate underlying unified sentence of ten years, with six years
fixed. On appeal, Garner contends that, pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f), a district court cannot
revoke probation unless it finds a willful probation violation. Garner further argues there
was insufficient evidence that he willfully violated his probation and, even if the evidence
was sufficient, the district court erred in revoking his probation.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In Docket No. 43493 (Canyon County Case No. CR-2014-11002), a grand jury
indicted Garner for first degree felony stalking. (R., pp.8-12.) In Docket No. 43494
(Canyon County Case No. CR-2014-11016), the state charged Garner with three counts
of felony possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm and/or deadly weapon during the
commission of a crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp.92-99.)
As part of a global plea agreement, Garner pled guilty to felony stalking in Docket
No. 43493, and in Docket No. 43494, Garner pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and one count of possession of a controlled substance.
(R., pp.113-114.) The court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with three years fixed
on all three charges; however, the sentences on the two possession charges were
ordered to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the sentence imposed on
the stalking charge. (R., pp.35-37, 136-138.) The court retained jurisdiction in both
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cases and, at the conclusion of the jurisdictional review period, the court placed Garner
on probation. (R., pp.35-40, 136-138, 151-153.)
Just over four months after the court placed Garner on probation, his probation
officer filed an Agent’s Warrant of Arrest in both cases. (R., pp.43, 155.) The state
subsequently filed a Petition for Probation Violation in both cases alleging Garner
violated his probation by leaving the district without permission and by violating the
condition that he follow his probation officer’s instructions, which included that he not
have contact with the victim in the stalking case.1 (R., pp.52-56, 158-162.)
Following an evidentiary hearing on the probation violation allegations, the district
court found that Garner violated his probation in both cases. (See generally 7/29/2015
Tr.) The court thereafter revoked Garner’s probation in Docket Nos. 43493 and 43494
and ordered his sentences executed.
(Docket No. 43494).)

(R., pp.58-59 (Docket No. 43493); 178-179

Garner timely appealed from the judgments revoking his

probation. (R., pp.60-62 (Docket No. 43493), 180-182 (Docket No. 43494).)

1

In Docket No. 43493, the state initially filed a Petition for Probation Violation on June
2, 2015, with a Report of Probation Violation dated May 29, 2015, which alleged Garner
violated his probation, in part, by violating condition number six from the probation
order, which read: “The defendant shall abide by the No Contact Order entered in this
matter.” (R., pp.45-47.) Three days later, the state filed a Petition for Probation
Violation in the same case with a Report of Probation Violation dated June 4, 2015,
which alleged a violation based on Garner’s failure to follow the probation officer’s
instruction “not to have contact with the victims in his stalking case,” instead of a
violation of condition number six. (R., pp.52-55.) The June 4, 2015 Report of Probation
Violation was also the basis for the Petition for Probation Violation filed in Docket No.
43494, and it appears that report was the subject of the evidentiary hearing. (Compare
R., pp.54-55 with R., pp.160-161; 7/29/2015 Tr., p.11, L.12 – p.13, L.19.)
2

ISSUES
Garner states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by revoking Mr. Garner’s probation and executing
his underlying aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed?
(Revised Appellant’s Brief (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case to decide whether I.C.R.
33(f) supplants the standards for revoking probation set forth in I.C. §§ 20-222, 19-2602,
and 19-2603 such that a defendant’s probation may only be revoked if the district court
finds a willful probation violation?2
2.
Has Garner failed to show there was insufficient evidence to support the
district court’s finding that he violated his probation or that the district court abused its
discretion in revoking Garner’s probation?

2

This same issue is also raised in State v. Hyatt, Docket No. 43139.
3

ARGUMENT
I.C.R. 33(f) Does Not Control A District Court’s Authority To Revoke Probation And
Garner Has Failed To Show, Under The Applicable Legal Standards, That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Finding He Violated His Probation Or By Revoking His
Probation Based On That Finding
A.

Introduction
The terms of Garner’s probation included that he not leave the Third Judicial

District without permission from his probation officer and that he follow his probation
officer’s instructions, which included that he not have contact with the victims in his
stalking case. (R., pp.54-55, 160-161.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the district
court found that Garner violated both of these conditions. (7/29/2015 Tr., p.59, L.14 –
p.63, L.22.) The court subsequently revoked Garner’s probation in Docket Nos. 43493
and 43494 and ordered his underlying sentences executed. (8/6/2015 Tr., p.17, Ls.1921; R., pp.58-59, 178-179.)
On appeal, Garner contends that, pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f), the district court could
not revoke his probation absent a finding that the violation was willful. (Appellant’s
Brief, p.4.) Garner also challenges the district court’s “factual finding that he violated
the terms of his probation,” and “its decision to revoke his probation.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.4.) All of Garner’s arguments fail. The statutes applicable to probation revocation
control a district court’s revocation decision and do not require a willful violation as a
predicate to revocation.

Further, application of the correct legal standards to the

evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing supports the district court’s finding that
Garner violated his probation and its decision to revoke Garner’s probation.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“The decision to revoke a defendant’s probation on a suspended sentence is one

within the discretion of the sentencing court.” State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 39, 773 P.2d
655, 656 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing I.C. § 20-222).

When a trial court’s discretionary

decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Ruperd,
146 Idaho 742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
“The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy,
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review.” Hansen
v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003).
C.

The District Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In
Revoking Garner’s Probation Upon Finding That He Violated The Conditions
Thereof, Regardless Of Whether The Violation Was Willful
Garner contends I.C.R. 33(f) precludes a district court from revoking probation in

the absence of a willful violation and he “challenges both the district court’s factual
finding that he violated the terms of his probation and its decision to revoke his
probation.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) All of Garner’s arguments fail.
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1. I.C.R. 33(f) Does Not Control A District Court’s Authority To Revoke
Probation; Rather, The Applicable Statutes Allow A District Court To Revoke
Probation Even If The Violation That Forms The Basis Of The Revocation
Decision Is Not Willful
Garner’s challenge to the district court’s finding that he violated his probation is
premised on the assertion that, under I.C.R. 33(f), the district court cannot revoke
probation unless it finds the probation violation was willful. (Appellant’s Brief, p.4) This
argument is contrary to the applicable statutes that govern the revocation of probation.
The authority of a trial court to revoke probation is governed by several statutes.
Among them, Idaho Code § 20-222 provides:
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon, the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. In making a
determination to continue or revoke probation and suspension of
sentence, the court shall consider the defendant’s risks and needs and
options for treatment in the community.
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant’s
probation when the defendant has violated “any of the conditions of probation.” I.C.
§ 20-222 (emphasis added). Nowhere in this statute is there a requirement that the
violation be “willful.”

Rather, the only limitation on the court’s authority to revoke

probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more
conditions of probation and the court must “consider the defendant’s risks and needs
and options for treatment in the community.”
Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad authority to
revoke probation. In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court’s “authority to revoke the
6

probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms or conditions of
the order.” Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798 (1953), quoted in
Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964). Idaho Code § 19-2602
authorizes a district court to “issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant”
either where “it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of them have
been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court.” (Emphasis added.)
“When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of
probation,” Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the court “may, if judgment has been
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.”
Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222,
Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have statutory
authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: “(1) [upon] satisfactory proof of a
violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] ‘any other cause satisfactory to the court.’”
State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C. §§ 19-2602
and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899, 900 (Ct. App.
1991); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho
at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App.
1986). It is true that Idaho’s appellate courts have held that a trial court must consider
alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant’s probation based on a
violation that was “not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s control.”
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106, 233 P.3d 33, 37 (2009).
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State v.

However, nothing in the

relevant statutes (or in the case law to this point) actually prevents a trial court from
revoking probation where the violation or other “cause satisfactory to the court” was not
willful.
Without even mentioning the statutes that govern a trial court’s authority to
revoke probation, Garner argues on appeal that the district court lacked authority to
revoke his probation because Rule 33(f) of the Idaho Criminal Rules states that a “court
shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by
the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of
probation." (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) The state acknowledges that the plain language of
this rule purports to divest trial courts of authority to revoke probation unless the
defendant admits, or the court finds, that the defendant “willfully violated a condition of
probation.” I.C.R. 33(f). The requirement of the rule that there be a willful probation
violation before a court may revoke probation is of no effect, however, because it
directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke probation granted by I.C. §§ 192602, 19-2603 and 20-222, and because a court’s authority to revoke probation is a
matter of substantive, not procedural, law.
“When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way
that results in a conflict.” State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387,
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916
(2008)). In this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R. 33(f) in a
way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222. Pursuant to the
rule, a trial court “shall not revoke probation unless … the defendant willfully violated a
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condition of probation.” I.C.R. 33(f). The statutes, on the other hand, give the court
broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of “any” of the probation
conditions or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court.” I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603,
20-222.
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, “this Court must
determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance.” Johnson, 145
Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 700
P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 391. “Substantive
law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of rulemaking and
procedure are generally the province of the judiciary.” Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228
P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; State v. Yoder, 96
Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 774 (1975)). Thus, if the conflict between a statute and
a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal rule will prevail. Johnson,
145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d
891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390. “Conversely, in matters
of substantive law, the statute applies.” Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at
390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893).
In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or, instead,
to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the following general
guidelines:
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments
for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary
rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially
mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and
remedies are effectuated.
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Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674,
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93;
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710, 228 P.3d at
391.
Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that
any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) – which requires a charging document to allege the
“essential facts constituting the offense charged” – and I.C. § 19-1430 – which
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that “no other facts
need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required in an
indictment against his principal” – was a matter of substantive law. Johnson, 145 Idaho
at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. Specifically, the Court explained:
The Legislature’s definition of principal and abolishment of the distinction
between principal and accessories does not pertain to mechanical
operations of the courts; the Legislature is creating, defining, and
regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive and does
not overlap with this Court’s power to create procedural rules. Therefore,
even if I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would
prevail.
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17.
Similarly, in Beam, supra, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a
death penalty case to file a challenge to his sentence within 42 days prevailed over
I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time. Beam, 121
Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893. The Court reasoned that, given the unique nature of the
death penalty, the statute “creates, defines, and regulates primary rights” and, as such,
was a matter of substantive law. Id.
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Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting a trial
court’s authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions of
probation or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court” are substantive in nature. It
is well-settled that probation, itself, “is not a matter of right; it may be granted the
defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within the ambit of
authority conferred by the legislature.” Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554.
Because a trial court’s power to place a defendant on probation only exists as a function
of the legislature’s power to enact substantive law, it follows that a court’s authority to
revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the province of the legislature.
See id. at 300-01, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted) (“The legislatures of the several
states have the exclusive and inherent power to define, prohibit and punish any act as a
crime within the limits of the federal and respective state constitutions.”). Indeed, a
review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely
prescribe the mechanical procedure a court must follow in revoking probation. Instead,
they actually define and regulate the circumstances under which a legislatively
authorized grant of probation may be revoked.
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must “‘be given due
deference and respect.’” Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting In re
SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)). Accordingly,
to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority granted to them
by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any probation
condition or for “any other cause satisfactory to the court,” the rule is of no effect.
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Garner’s argument that the district court could not revoke his probation without finding
he willfully violated the conditions of his probation is without merit.
2. Under The Correct Legal Standards, Garner Has Failed To Show The District
Court Erred In Finding Garner Violated His Probation Or Abused Its
Discretion In Revoking His Probation
“In reviewing a probation revocation proceeding, [this Court] use[s] a two-step
analysis.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citing State v. Knutsen, 138
Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). The first step “ask[s] whether the
defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. “For the first step, a district court’s
finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the finding.”

Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36

(citations omitted). “In the event of conflicting evidence, [this Court] will defer to the
district court’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.” Id. If the Court
determines the defendant did violate his probation, the second step asks “what should
be the consequences of that violation.” Id. (citing Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at
1070). “A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal
absent a showing that the district court abused its discretion.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at
105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 381 P.2d 1337, 1340
(Ct. App. 1994)).
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding
that Garner violated his probation by failing to follow his probation officer’s instruction
that he not have contact with the victims in his stalking case, and Garner has failed to
show the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
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One of the conditions of probation in both of Garner’s cases was that he “follow
[the] advice and instructions of the supervising officer,” which included that he was “not
to have contact with the victims in his stalking case.” (R., pp.54-55, 160-161.) Both
cases also had a condition of probation that Garner “not leave the State or Third Judicial
district (Adams, Gem, Canyon, Owyhee, Payette, and Washington counties) without first
obtaining written permission from the supervising officer.” (R., pp.54, 160.) The basis
of the state’s Petition for Probation Violation in both of Garner’s cases was his failure to
abide by these two conditions.

(R., pp.52-55, 158-161.)

The evidence the state

presented at the evidentiary hearing to support these allegations included the testimony
of Garner’s probation officer, Betsy Owen, one of his stalking victims, Sarah Estep, and
Officer Donald Peck. (See generally 7/29/2015 Tr., pp.14-58.)
Probation Officer Owen testified that (1) she was responsible for supervising
Garner on probation (7/29/2015 Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.15, L.2); (2) a term of Garner’s
probation was that he could not have contact with the victims of his stalking case,
including Sarah Estep (id. at p.15, Ls.11-17); (3) another term of Garner’s probation was
that he could not leave the Third Judicial District without her permission (id. at p.15,
L.25 – p.16, L.4); (4) she received a call from the probation office “from District Four in
Boise” advising that Garner “was in Boise and was allegedly stalking the victims again”
(id. at p.17, Ls.2-8); (5) when she asked Garner about being in Boise on May 21, 2015,
he made different excuses, including that he was “on his way to go fishing” an “had
stopped to go to an AA meeting” (id. at p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.11); and (6) she had not
given Garner permission to be in Boise on May 21, 2015 (id. at p.18, L.12 – p.19, L.3).
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Sarah testified that on May 21, 2015, she saw Garner parked across the street
from her workplace, which is located in Boise.

(7/29/2015 Tr. p.36, Ls.14-23.)

Specifically, Sarah testified that, as she was leaving work, Garner “was parked across
from our parking lot in the Albertsons parking lot.” (Id. at p.36, L.14 – p.37, L.16.)
Sarah “immediately grabbed [her] cell phone and took pictures” of Garner’s car and
called the police once she got home. (Id. at p.37, L.21 – p.38, L.14.) Garner was
parked about 30 yards from where Sarah works. (Id. at p.39, Ls.1-4.) Although Garner
did not try to talk to Sarah, she could see Garner sitting in his truck looking at her in his
rearview mirror and it “looked like he smiled.” (Id. at p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.23.)
Officer Peck testified that he reviewed the photographs Sarah took, and was able
to see the license plate number on the truck. (7/29/2015 Tr., p.48, Ls.12-14.) The
license plate number for the truck in Sarah’s photographs was registered to Garner. (Id.
at p.48, Ls.15-22.)
A series of text messages retrieved from Garner’s phone was also admitted into
evidence at the probation violation hearing. (Exhibits 1, 2.) Those text messages,
which were between Garner and someone named “Diamond,” read:
Fuck my ex just drove by and took a pic of my truck
Wtf?
The one that says I’m stalking her
Stupid.
I’ll beat her fucking ass
She was in a blue [illegible] van
Weird
She is going to try to bust me
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Fuck why the fuck
My phone is dead
U can say u were looking at some places for rent
Does she live in Boise?
Where were u at?
I was in alberts[ons] parking lot
I’m on the street you walk down
(Exhibits 1, 2.)
Based on the evidence presented, the district court found Garner violated his
probation by leaving the district without permission and by having prohibited contact
with Sarah, the victim in his stalking case, by sitting outside Sarah’s “place of
employment on or about May 21, 2015.”

(See R., pp.160-161 (handwritten notes

reflecting court’s findings); 7/29/2015 Tr., p.59, L.14 – p.63, L.22 (oral findings at
conclusion of evidentiary hearing).) There was substantial evidence in the record to
support both of these findings.
On appeal, Garner does not challenge the district court’s finding that he violated
his probation by leaving the Third Judicial District; he only challenges the finding that he
violated his probation by having contact with Sarah. (Appellant’s Brief, p.10 n.6.) With
respect to the latter finding, Garner argues there was “insufficient evidence to establish
that [he] willfully violated the no contact order and willfully disobeyed the supervising
officer’s instruction not to contact the victim” (Appellant’s Brief, p.6), which was alleged
to have occurred when Garner “was in Ada [C]ounty at [Sarah’s] place of employment
on or about May 21, 2015” (R., pp.55, 161). Although willfulness is not a prerequisite to
revocation (see subsection C.1., supra), in this case, the evidence supports a finding
that Garner willfully violated his probation officer’s instruction not to have contact with
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the victims in his stalking case.3 The evidence showed that Garner was within 30 yards
of Sarah’s work, sitting in his truck, and looking at Sarah in his rearview mirror. This
conduct violated Garner’s probation officer’s instruction that Garner not have contact
with Sarah, which would include not knowingly remaining within 300 feet of her or her
workplace.
Garner’s claim that the evidence was insufficient is based on his assertion that
he “inadvertently or accidentally went to a grocery store that he did not know was
across the street from the victim’s work.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) That Garner wanted
the district court to draw this inference does not mean the evidence was insufficient to
support the district court’s contrary finding. It is well-settled that a factfinder “may infer
intent from the defendant’s conduct, or from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Crowe,
135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Moreover,
there was no actual evidence that Garner “inadvertently or accidentally” parked across
the street from Sarah’s workplace and sat in his truck and watched her from his
rearview mirror. While it is true, as Garner notes, that he was not required to “disprove
the State’s allegations” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8), it is equally true that the district court
was not required to conclude that his behavior was “inadvertent[ ] or accidental[ ]” when

3

It appears the parties defined “contact” in relation to the probation officer’s instruction
as being consistent with the No Contact Order, which precluded Garner from
“harass[ing], follow[ing], contact[ing], attempt[ing] to contact, communicat[ing] with in
any form, or knowingly remain[ing] within 300 feet of the victim(s) or his/her property,
residence, work or school.” (R., p.19.) Garner did not dispute this below or on appeal.
16

the evidence supported a contrary finding. Garner has failed to show error in the district
court’s finding that he violated his probation.4
At the disposition hearing, the district court5 revoked Garner’s probation in both
cases and ordered his sentences executed. (8/6/2015 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-21.) Garner
contends the court abused its discretion in doing so because, he argues, he “had a
serious drug addiction to prescription medications when he began the rider program,”
but “did very well on the rider” regardless, “had been testing ‘clean for drugs’” since, and
“was finally able to obtain full-time employment,” “attend[] church,” go to Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, and “do the family thing.”

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12

(quotations and transcript citations omitted).) Contrary to Garner’s argument on appeal,
“these facts” do not show an abuse of discretion by the district court.

4

Garner also argues “remand is necessary because the district court did not make a
finding that the violations were willful, which is explicitly required by I.C.R. 33(f).”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.) To the extent I.C.R. 33(f) applies, it does not require an
express finding of willfulness. Moreover, when a district court finds a defendant violated
his probation, unless the district court finds otherwise, the presumption is that the
violation was willful. See State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1992)
(noting the district court “implicitly determined that Peterson’s disregard of the reporting
obligation was willful”). Application of this standard is consistent with the general
principle that even in the absence of express factual findings, the appellate court will
uphold any implicit findings by the district court that are supported by substantial
evidence. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (“The
implicit findings of the trial court, (i.e., that statements of the defendant made to the
police were voluntary and should not be suppressed) should be overturned only if not
supported by substantial evidence.”); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d
641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence should be given due deference.”).
5

The Honorable Christopher S. Nye sentenced Garner and revoked his probation, but
the Honorable Dennis E. Goff presided over the evidentiary hearing. (Compare
7/29/2015 Tr. with 8/6/2015 Tr. and R., pp.35-37, 136-138.)
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“The applicable legal standard the district court must utilize in determining
whether to revoke probation is based upon whether the violation was willful or nonwillful.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37; see also State v. Easley, 156 Idaho
214, 222-223, 322 P.3d 296, 304-305 (2014) (citing Sanchez). If the probation violation
was “knowing and intentional,” the district court’s decision to revoke is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37 (citing State v. Leach,
135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). If, however, the violation “was
not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s control, a court may not revoke probation
and order imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the
violation.” Id. (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713).
Because Garner’s probation violation was willful, the district court’s decision to
revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by revoking Garner’s probation in light of Garner’s willful disregard of two
significant conditions of his probation, one of which included behavior similar to that
which gave rise to one of his convictions. (See R., pp.8-9 (allegations in Indictment for
stalking).) Garner’s arguments on appeal regarding his performance during the retained
jurisdiction program, his efforts to address his drug use, and his employment status
ignore the conduct that gave rise to the probation violations and do not demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the district court.
Garner has failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the district court’s
finding that he violated his probation and he has failed to show the district court abused
its discretion in revoking his probation.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment revoking Garner’s
probation and ordering his sentences executed in Docket Nos. 43493 and 43494.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2016.

__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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